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Abstract.      
During 2005-2018, the “Sharing Economy” (which includes Airbnb; Apple; Alibaba, Uber; WeWork; Liquidspace, 
Lyft; Ebay; Didi Chuxing; Taxify; Amazon; HomeAway; etc.) blossomed across the world, triggered structural 
changes in industries and significantly affected international capital flows primarily by disobeying a wide variety of 
statutes laws in many countries and illegally reducing and changing the nature of competition in many industries 
often to the detriment of social welfare. Furthermore, Uber’s and Airbnb’s pricing systems are not efficient and can 
generate deadweight-losses and Regret. Other “sharing economy companies” (“SEOs”) also face similar pricing, 
antitrust, deadweight-loss and Regret issues (eg. WeWork; Lyft; Taxify; LiquidSpace; ShareDesk; Homeaway; 
etc.). This article: i) develops new dynamic pricing models for the Sharing Economy companies; ii) derives some 
stability properties of mixed games and dynamic algorithms that are inherent in new dynamic pricing models 
introduced herein which eliminate antitrust liability for SEOs and also reduce deadweight losses, greed, Regret and 
GPS manipulation - that is, the new dynamic pricing models exhibit “Multi-Stability”. The new dynamic pricing 
models have desirable properties such as individual rationality; exact and approximate welfare maximization; 
strong budget balance; dominant-strategy incentive compatibility of sellers and buyers; pareto optimality and 
feasibility – and thus, each model contravenes the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem. The pricing 
models include multi-sided auctions wherein at any time t, several auctions can simultaneously occur, and the 
payoff functions of any buyer-seller pair in any auction depends on the bidding done by at least another buyer-seller 
pair either at the same time, or at a different time (this “long-memory” bias of buyers and sellers is new in the 
literature). More importantly the issues and models discussed herein have or can have significant implications for 
inequality, labor mobility and income dynamics (for employees of SEOs).     
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1. Introduction.  
The motivation for this article is varied. First, the “Sharing Economy” and the advent of digital currencies 
can be attributed to significant and rising consumer debt, inequality, low savings rates, internet penetration and the 
perceived inefficiencies of regulation. House-sharing companies (Airbnb, Homeaway), ride hailing/sharing 
companies (Uber; Lyft; Grab), App-stores (Google App Store; Apple IoS; Facebook app-store), office-space-
sharing companies (WeWork; Liquidspace; ShareDesk), freelancer-sharing platforms (VWorker; Guru; ODesk; 
Elance, and Freelancer.com), shared-marketing platforms (Ebay; Amazon; Amazon-Flex; Alibaba), online 
filesharing platforms (Bittorent) and online information-sharing platforms (Instagram; Facebook) are among a 
group of internet based “Sharing Economy” companies and technologies (collectively, the “Sharing Economy 
Organizations” or “SEOs”).  
Second, during 2010-2018, most SEOs thrived primarily by disobeying various laws in many countries - 
see Nwogugu (2017) which explains the many violations of statutes by SEOs including health (number of 
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occupants; sanitation; etc.); fire-protection (number of occupants; use of flammable materials; damage of fire doors; 
lack of knowledge of fire drills; etc.), housing, zoning, hotel, tax, securities, labor, taxi/transportation; insurance; 
antitrust; banking; electronic commerce; and consumer protection statutes. Government regulators often cannot 
afford to enforce those laws. There is abundant evidence that SEOs’ past and current activities significantly harm 
cities and reduce social welfare in many economies.  
 Third, Uber’s “Surge Pricing” is a form of dynamic pricing technology (dynamic pricing has been around 
for more than twenty five years). As of 2017, Uber’s “Surge Pricing” was available only in high-demand periods 
and could result in prices that were ten times the normal prices. Mohlmann & Zalmanson (December 2017) and 
newspaper articles have noted that Uber’s drivers knowingly colluded to increase “Surge Prices”1; and that Uber’s 
customers can game the “Surge Pricing” system to reduce prices (eg. by crossing to the other side of the street and 
or by waiting for five minutes). Uber’s drivers have been reported to have manipulated GPS readings 
(measurements of distance used for calculating Uber’s fees) by using a third-party GPS app named Lockito2.    
 Fourth, the SEOs’ difficulties in developing and implementing efficient pricing mechanisms translates into, 
and amplifies other problems – such as antitrust violations; deadweight losses, Regret; etc..  
Fifth, dynamic algorithms have not been addressed adequately in the literature, especially their stability 
properties. Dynamic Algorithms are a class of algorithms whose path or process changes or can change as state-
variables change. On algorithms in general, see: Garcia, Berlanga, Molina & Davila (2004).     
Sixth, mixed games have not been addressed adequately in the literature, especially their stability properties 
– mixed games are situations wherein two more games-types exist or can exist simultaneously and either 
continuously or discontinuously.   
Seventh, the issues and models discussed herein have or can have significant implications for inequality, 
labor mobility and income dynamics (for employees of SEOs). Many such employees around the world depend on 
SEOs for all or part of their monthly income, which is related to their aspirations, social mobility and geographical 
mobility (eg. qualified drivers of Uber or Lyft ). However, its become clear that in addition to reducing Social 
welfare (increasing Noise; pollution; code violations; etc.) many SEOs also increase Inequality by underpaying 
their workers (through inefficient pricing algorithms).    
By addressing these issues, this article contributes to the mechanism design, policy, dynamic algorithms, 
theoretical computer science; Labor Economics, Social Welfare and Complex Systems literatures.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 See: “Uber Drivers Gang Up To Cause Surge Pricing, Research Says”. The Telegraph (UK). Cara McGoogan.  
August 2, 2017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/02/uber-drivers-gang-cause-surge-pricing-
research-says/. (stating that “Researchers at the University of Warwick found that Uber drivers in London and New 
York have been tricking the app into thinking there is a shortage of cars in order to raise surge prices. According to 
the study, drivers manipulate Uber's algorithm by logging out of the app at the same time, making it think that there 
is a shortage of cars. Uber raises its fare prices when there is a high demand for vehicles and a short supply of 
drivers available. Fares are known to increase during peak times such as rush hour, during public events and late at 
night. Surge pricing can boost the cost of rides to multiple times the normal rate. The study said drivers have been 
coordinating forced surge pricing, after interviews with drivers in London and New York, and research on online 
forums such as Uberpeople.net.….…Separate research at Northeastern University (USA) has previously found 
passengers can game surge pricing with simple tricks such as waiting five minutes or crossing the road.…….”).    
See: “Uber Drivers Work Together To Create Price Surge And Charge Customers More, Researchers Find - Some 
Drivers Are Deliberately Going Offline In Unison So That Prices Surge And They Can Charge Customers More 
When They Log Back Into The App”. Ben Chapman, August 2, 2017. 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/uber-drivers-work-together-price-surge-go-offline-charge-
customers-more-game-app-supply-demand-a7872871.html.  
2
 See: “Uber Drivers In Lagos Are Using A Fake GPS App To Inflate Rider Fares”. Yemisi Adegoke. November 
13, 2017. https://qz.com/1127853/uber-drivers-in-lagos-nigeria-use-fake-lockito-app-to-boost-
fares/?utm_source=qzfb. 
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2. Existing Literature.      
There is a growing academic and practitioner literature on the economics and regulation of SEOs
3
 but all of the 
studies (eg. Edelman & Geradin (April 2016a;b); Edelman (2015; 2017)) didn’t develop comprehensive pricing 
models that reduce SEOs’ legal liabilities; and also didn’t address some macroeconomic issues (such as 
international capital flows and structural changes which are intertwined with antitrust issues). As of 2017, many 
SEOs were defendants in court cases around the world for criminal and civil claims including antitrust violations, 
fraud, conspiracy, violations of criminal statutes; etc.. Edelman (June 2017) specifically advocated that Uber should 
be shut down because its business model is inherently illegal and its global legal liability far exceeds its total assets. 
Like Uber and as of 2017, many SEOs were technically insolvent because the statutes-of-limitations for their 
offenses had not expired (and the statute-of-limitations can be judicially extended in various ways) and their legal 
liability far exceeded their assets and equity. Malhotra & Van Alstyne (2014), Hellwig, Morhart, Girardin & Hauser 
(2015), Cusumano (2015), Cohen & Kietzmann (2014), Belk (2013; 2014) and Huefner (2015) discussed the 
sharing economy and applicable business models. 
On Deep Learning and Regret Minimization in Mechanism Design, see: Feng, Narasimhan & Parkes 
(2018), Dutting, Feng, et. al. (2019) and Sandholm & Likhodedov (2015). On other Artificial Inteligence 
approaches, see: Rigas, Ramchurn & Bassiliades (2018), Zohar & Rosenschein (2008), Jain, Gujar, et. al. (2018), 
Aziz & Lev (2019), Peng, Al Chami, et. al. (2019), Gondran, Huguet, et. al. (2018), Chassaing, Duhamel & 
Lacomme (2016), Doshi, Gmytrasiewicz & Durfee (2020), and Mitchell (2006). Mohri & Medina (2014) and 
Nazerzadeh, Leme, et. al. (2016) analyzed learning algorithms. On algorithms in general, see: Garcia, Berlanga, 
Molina & Davila (2004).   
Colini-Baldeschi, Goldberg, et. al. (Nov. 2017); Deng, Goldberg, Tang & Zhang (2014); Satterthwaite & 
Williams (1989), Dütting, Roughgarden & Talgam-Cohen (2014), Baranwal & Vidyarthi (2015), Wang, Chin & 
Yin (2011), Scalas, Rapallo & Radivojević (2017), Zhao (2012) and Zhang (2018) analyzed two-sided auctions. 
Wang & Wang (2015); Rao, Xiao, et. al. (2017); and Hara & Hato (2017) analyzed car-sharing auctions and 
transportation auctions. Liu, Zhu & Hu (2016) and Leung & Knottenbelt (2011) analyzed other types of auctions.  
Hill (2015), Techcrunch (2015), Krämer, Schmidt, Spann & Stich (2017), and Gibbs, Guttentag & Gretzel (2018) 
studied dynamic pricing in general and issues pertaining to Airbnb and Uber.  
Banerjee, Johari & Riquelme (Nov. 2015) and Kung & Zhong (2017) discussed dynamic pricing models for 
ride-sharing platforms and the sharing economy respectively. On pricing in ride sharing/hailing networks, see: 
Afeche, Liu & Maglaras (2017), Afeche, Liu & Maglaras (2017), Banerjee, Freund & Lykouris (2016), Banerjee, 
Riquelme & Johari (2015), Bimpikis, Candogan & Saban (2016), Feng, Kong & Wang (2017), Nikzad (2018), and 
Ozkan & Ward (2016). On Surge-Pricing in ride sharing/hailing networks, see: Castillo, Knoepfle & Weyl (2017), 
Chan, Yom-Tov & Escobar (2014), Besbes, Castro & Lobel (2018), Mohlmann & Zalmanson (December 2017) 
and Cachon, Daniels & Lobel (2017). Srinivasan, Rajharhia, Radhakrishnan, Sharma & Khincha (2017); Thille, 
                                                          
3
 See: Edelman & Geradin (April 2016a); Edelman (2015); Edelman & Geradin (April 2016b); Edelman (June 
2017); Dickerson & Hinds-Radix (April 2016). Estis & Lycoyannis (April 6, 2016); US Federal Trade commission 
(2016); Koopman, et al. (2015); and Eckhardt & Bardhi (2015). 
See: “Uber Scandals”. http://www.uberscandals.org/.      
See: New York State Office of the Attorney General (Oct. 2014). “Airbnb In The City”. 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/airbnb%20reportpdf.  
See: In the Matter of the Investigation by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York 
(NYAG), of Uber Technologies, Inc.. January 5, 2016. 
See: “Violent Massive Street Fighting In Jakarta Over Uber And Grab Taxi Services”.   
www.eturbonews.com. March 22, 2016.  
See: “Nairobi’s Taxi Drivers Turn To Violence To Halt Uber”. www.eturbonews.com 
January 28, 2016.            
See: “Disruptive Innovation: Application Of Competition Law In The Sharing Economy In The Year Ahead”. 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, London, UK. http://antitrust.freshfields.com/disruptive-innovation. 
See: European Commission – Press release: “A European Agenda For The Collaborative Economy”.   
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2001_en.htm.     
See: Russo, F., “Defining The Relevant Market In The Sharing Economy”. Available at: 
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/defining-relevant-market-sharing-economy.                           
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Cojocaru, et. al. (2013); Makhdoumi, Malekian & Ozdaglar (2017); and Nakhe (2017) developed dynamic pricing 
models for various markets.          
Mashayekhy, Nejad & Grosu (2014) studied two-sided matching. Jacobs (2012) discussed coalgebras. 
Nissam (2007) summarized mechanism design. Feudel, Pisarchik & Showalter (2018); Wang, Xu & Lai (2018); 
Anzo-Hernández, Gilardi-Velázquez & Campos-Cantón (2018); and Kwasnioka (2018) analyzed multistability. 
Levina, Levin, et. al. (2006). Niels & Ten Kate (2000) analyzed Predatory Pricing. 
 
2.1. LUPI And LUBA Are Not Applicable. 
Ostling, Wang, Chou & Camerer (2011) and Zeng, Davis & Abbott (2007) analyzed the “lowest unique 
positive integer” game (LUPI) and related approaches. Bruss, Louchard & Ward (2009)4; Pigolotti, Bernhardsson, 
Juul, et. al. (2012); and Zhao, Chen & Wang (2013) analyzed inverse auctions that have unique minima (the 
“lowest unique bid auction” or “LUBA”). LUPI and LUBA are not directly applicable to the circumstances of 
many SEOs but are mentioned here as types of auctions. The analysis in Bruss, Louchard & Ward (2009) and in the 
literature on LUBA and LUPI isn’t quite correct and the errors/omissions are as follows: i) the problem is not a 
two-sided problem in a mathematical or economics sense (lack of knowledge of the number of bidders and the 
distribution of bids does not make the problem two-sided); ii) the auction studied is not a two-sided auction because 
only one side (the buyer-side) bids; iii) the analogy to an “urn problem” is completely wrong and isn’t applicable; 
iv) the process of Poissonization alone or together with de-Poissonization does not solve the problem of placing a 
winning bid because the process distorts data relationships (poissonization is based on the natural log scale whose 
non-linearity is unlikely to fit, or is not guaranteed to fit patterns in the auctions), and there is no guarantee that the 
bids will conform to any known distribution; and the number of bidders and the distribution of bids is unknown ex-
ante; v) the bidding model should be based on, but does not consider the bidder’s costs, budget constraints, mental 
states, propensity-to-substitute and opportunity costs.  
 
2.2. Algorithm Collusion.      
One issue that hasn’t been sufficiently addressed in the literature (AI; Mechanism Design; Dynamic Pricing) is 
intentional and unintentional collusion by autonomous/intelligent pricing algorithms (of either the same company or 
of different/competing companies) which sometimes results in increases in final prices (“Intentional Algorithm 
Collusion” and “Unintentional Algorithm Collusion” respectively). As of 2019, most countries had not developed 
antitrust or consumer protection laws for such Collusion. Algorithm Collusion is relatively difficult to detect and 
prosecute. Also see the comments in: Calvano, Calzolari, Denicolò & Pastorello (2018); Ezrachi & Stucke (2015); 
Harrington (2018); Schwalbe (2018) and Kühn & Tadelis (2018).  
In an empirical study with AI-based pricing algorithms in a controlled environment Calvano, Calzolari, 
et.al. (February 2019) noted that even relatively simple pricing algorithms learned and engaged in Price Collusion 
by trial and error, without any prior knowledge of their operating environment and without communicating with 
each another, and without being specifically designed or instructed to collude. Algorithm Collusion can be partly 
attributed to: i) the design, “learning-process” and updating of each pricing algorithm (how data is gathered and 
processed by each algorithm in each time period); ii) the relevance or “weights” assigned to each specific data 
source by each pricing algorithm; iii) the use of common sources of data by the pricing algorithms; iv) the 
knowledge/training of the designers of each pricing algorithms (designers who have the same knowledge and use 
the same approaches/models are more likely to cause Algorithm Collusion.      
 
 
3. Complexity And Structural Changes.      
The literature about the relationship between complexity and structural change is developed and includes 
Robert & Yoguel (2016); Cimoli, Pereima & Porcile (2016); Dosi & Virgillito (2017); Comim (2000); Heinrich & 
Dai (2016); and Brida, Anyul & Punzo (2003).  
SEOs represent, have caused and continue to evolve major structural changes in several global industries 
(including housing, lodging, retailing/ecommerce, distribution, financial services and transportation) and their 
pricing models have been a distinctive feature. Such structural changes are often intertwined with antitrust issues. 
The pricing models of Uber, Lyft, Taxify, WeWork and Liquidspace represent structural changes in their respective 
                                                          
4 See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_reverse_auction and http://en; and 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Unique_bid_auction.  
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industry segments. Uber’s and Google’s forays into driverless-cars marks another major change that can have 
significant implications for the manufacturing, transportation and internet/software sectors. The structural changes 
in these industries have been in the form of the following: i) the shift of transactions to the internet and changes in 
modes and timing of payment; ii) pricing models – which often affect competition, firm structure and industry 
structure; iii) antitrust issues; iv) technological advances, automation, reduction of labor and training of technology 
staff; v) industry consolidation through better and faster aggregation of individual suppliers and customers (as 
opposed to acquisitions of companies); v) increased Network Effects in industries; vi) significant reductions in the 
operating costs and marketing expenses of some companies (eg. SEOs and their hosts/merchants/drivers) some of 
which was achieved by disobeying laws; vii) low compliance (with regulations) by SEOs and their 
drivers/hosts/merchants; viii) major changes in, and evolution of the operations strategies of both SEOs and 
traditional incumbents (ie. brick-and-mortar hotels/resorts, retailing chains; taxi companies; distributors; 
manufacturers; etc.).       
  The structural changes in these affected industries conform to the Operations Strategy Model of Structural 
Change (OSMSC) and other new theories of structural change that were introduced in Nwogugu (Revised 2013).    
 
4. Some Antitrust Problems Of SEOs. 
In 2016, the EU confirmed the antitrust liability of companies for anti-competitive conduct of their 
employees and agents
5
. Most of the SEOs discussed herein have two-sided platforms wherein their 
landlords/hosts/drivers/merchants are alleged to be independent contractors. Thus, such SEOs can be held liable for 
antitrust misconduct of their drivers/hosts/landlords/merchants. Furthermore, private equity firms have also been 
held liable for the antitrust misconduct of their portfolio company
6
 – Nwogugu (2017) introduced the Extended 
Duty Theory which is different; and also explains the antitrust liabilities of SEOs.  
See the comments: Dickerson & Hinds-Radix (April 2016); Cusumano (2015); Cohen & Kietzmann 
(2014); Nwogugu (2017); Niels & Ten Kate (2000); Mleczko (March 24, 2017); Markham (Oct. 2014); Khan 
(2017); Koopman, et. al. (2015); Heinrich & Dai (2016); Edelman & Geradin (April 2016b); Edelman (2015); and 
Eckhardt & Bardhi (2015). 
 
5. New Dynamic Pricing Models That Reduce Antitrust Liability, Regret And Deadweight Losses; And Provides 
Driver Incentives And Customer-Incentives; And Reduces Manipulation Of GPS-Readings By Drivers.  
This section introduces some new dynamic pricing models with embedded multi-sided auctions which are 
also dynamic algorithms. Several types of games (ie. matching games; assignment games; differential games; 
reverse-dutch auctions; and combinatorial auctions) and algorithms are simultaneously involved in the dynamic 
pricing models proposed herein, and most of the games are multi-stage non-cooperative games. However, the 
payoff-functions of each dynamic pricing model can account for each type of game involved. The models/solutions 
introduced herein are essentially dynamic algorithms and protocols whose processes/paths can change as state-
variables change. The solutions/models can be built as online learning systems that gather, update and use 
information about state-variables. For taxi-SEOs, the state variables can include the number of participating drivers; 
ride fees; bidding patterns; allocation method; distances travelled; travel time; traffic conditions; types of 
customers; number of occupants in each car; types of drivers; types of cars; in-car conditions such as air-
conditioning and no-smoking; etc.). For real estate SEOs such as Airbnb, the state variables can include the number 
of participating landlords and renters; rental fees; bidding patterns; allocation method; local market conditions; 
types of renters; number of occupants in each housing unit; types of landlords/sub-letters; types of housing units; 
in-house conditions such as air-conditioning and no-smoking; etc.). 
                                                          
5
 See: Thomas, C., DiStefano, G. & Jubrail, D. (Hogan Lovells) (Aug. 2016). Antitrust Liability for Anti-
competitive Behaviour by Employees and Contractors. https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/blogs/focus-on-
regulation/antitrust-liability-for-anti-competitive-behaviour-by-employees-and-contractors.  
6
 See: Vinje, T. (Clifford Chance) (April 2014). Private equity liability for antitrust fines. 
https://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2014/04/private_equity_liabilityforantitrustfines.html. This article stated 
in part “……The European Commission has imposed a €37 million fine on Goldman Sachs (GS) for antitrust 
breaches committed by a portfolio company that was formerly owned by its private equity arm, GS Capital 
Partners.  The fine was joint and several on GS and the portfolio company (Prysmian).  It was imposed on the basis 
that GS exercised decisive influence over the portfolio company, though GS is not alleged to have participated in, 
been aware of or facilitated the alleged cartel in any way. ……….”    
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The auctions introduced are multi-sided auctions because its highly probable that: i) at any time t, several 
auctions are occurring, and ii) the payoff functions of any buyer-seller pair in any auction depends on the bidding 
done by at least another buyer-seller pair either at the same time, or at a different time (this “Related-Memory” 
effect of buyers and sellers is new in the literature); iii) a seller (eg. a taxi driver) can simultaneously bid in 
different auctions for different contracts; and a buyer (eg. taxi customer) can open several auctions for bidding for 
similar contracts (eg. a taxi customer at Location-A can open 2-3 auctions for bidding for rides that start at 
Location-A or within 100 meters from Location-A).     
As of 2017, Uber’s “Surge Pricing” was available only in high-demand periods and could result in prices 
that were ten times the normal prices. Unlike Uber’s “Surge Pricing” and traditional SEO pricing, the Type-1, 
Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes introduced herein and below can be available at any time, and 
they don’t violate antitrust statutes (eg. price fixing; price discrimination; etc.); they reduce or eliminate Regret and 
Deadweight Losses; and eliminate manipulation of GPS readings by drivers; and can improve social welfare.  
The new dynamic-pricing models introduced herein differ from both LUBA and LUPI in the following 
ways: i) only the lowest bid is used, and it doesn’t have to be a unique-bid, and where two persons bid the same 
lowest amount, the BBB App will select the bidder with the lower estimated arrival time and or the higher quality 
score; ii) the drivers and customers don’t have to pay any fee to participate in the bidding, but may pay a fee if they 
don’t bid when selected; iii) the auction is two-sided because for each ride, both the drivers and the customer bids; 
iv) the auction is “cross-contingent” because for each ride, the drivers’ bids are or can be affected by other 
available auctions for other rides in the same network, and the customers’ bid is affected by other customers’ bids 
in the network; v) the bidding processes is part of a matching process; vi) the bidding process can reduce 
deadweight losses. 
Thus, the auctions introduced herein are two new classes of auctions which are as follows: 
i) The “two-sided cross-contingent auctions”.   
ii) The “double-bid two-sided auction” – wherein both sides of a two-sided auction simultaneously bid.  
 
Each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes herein and below are a new type 
of dynamic pricing henceforth referred to as “Two-sided State-Contingent dynamic pricing”. The pricing system is 
two-sided because both sides of the transaction (the drivers and the customers) can participate in the price-setting 
process; and at any time, more than one customer can use the system, and a customer’s bidding and use of BBB’s 
vehicle affects or can affect other customer’s prices and bidding. The customers in each city essentially compete for 
a finite number of BBB vehicles; while drivers compete for a finite number of customers). The system is state-
contingent because each party in both sides of the transaction (drivers and the customer) can choose more than one 
“state”. The pricing scheme can also include a “Fulfillment Guarantee” wherein the booked customer must appear 
and take the ride within a specific number of minutes after the driver arrived at the designated location, and if the 
customer defaults, he/she will pay a fee to BBB, part of which will be paid to the driver. Where the Arrival-
Guarantee and or Fulfillment Guarantee is included in the pricing scheme, each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3 and 
Type-4 pricing schemes are a new type of dynamic pricing henceforth referred to as “Two-sided State-Contingent 
Time-Contingent dynamic pricing”. The system is time-contingent because at least one party on each side of the 
transaction (driver or customer) has a time-based obligation that directly affects the pricing mechanism.  
 
5.1. Common Elements Of The New Dynamic Pricing Schemes – Anti-Collusion; Privacy; Preferences; Incentives; 
Etc..  
The following are some common factors among the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 dynamic 
pricing schemes:  
i) Each of the new pricing mechanisms can be a combinatorial auction because each customer is bidding for 
a group of discrete items such as arrival-time (of the driver), the taxi-ride, amenities in the taxi-vehicle; the 
driver’s and vehicle’s compliance with applicable regulations. Conversely, each driver is bidding for a 
group of discrete items such as arrival-time (of the customer), the taxi-ride, and fees to be paid by the 
customer.       
ii) Each of the new pricing mechanisms are multi-sided auctions because for each “contract” (eg. a taxi-
ride), several providers (drivers) can simultaneously bid for the contract and other un-related contracts; and 
the customer can also create new related and un-related contracts.       
iii) Each of the new pricing mechanisms are matching games; assignment games and types of reverse-dutch 
auctions. 
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iv) In some cities, taxi drivers gather/line-up at specific locations to chat or pickup customers and can 
collude to set prices and or the timing of rides. In other instances, drivers that are not in proximity can also 
collude to switch off their phones at certain times or not to accept rides. For Type-3 and Type-4 pricing 
schemes, drivers that collude to engage in price-fixing or price discrimination can be discovered and will be 
penalized. For example, such colluding drivers can be discovered by: 1) by checking for loose groups of 
drivers that bid from one neighborhood wherein their bids are within a 10%-/+ band of the median bid for 
each customer for a specific number of customers within a time frame; 2) checking for drivers that switch 
off their cellphones at or around the same time on more than two occasions.  
v) In dynamic pricing systems for taxi-companies, setting the driver’s “Preferences” to “automatic states” 
can drastically reduce the distractions and accidents that occur when drivers use their cellphones while 
driving.  
vi) For each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes, each customer’s bid will 
not be disclosed to any other customer or any driver that is not among the 3-15 selected drivers; and each 
driver’s bid for any customer will not be disclosed to any other driver or customer; and the customer’s 
identity will not be disclosed to any driver, and the bidding drivers’ identity will not be disclosed to any 
customer, and only the winning/assigned driver will be introduced to the customer after the customer pays 
for the ride.  
vii) In cities/towns that have adequate GIS data, and for each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and 
Type-5 pricing schemes, the entire price-setting process can be 100% automated (no human intervention) in 
BBB’s App and can take less than five minutes.  
viii) Each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes can include an “Arrival 
Guarantee” wherein at the time of bidding, each driver also posts a guaranteed time-of-arrival at the 
customer’s location and if the driver defaults, the customer will get a 15%-35% price discount which will 
be deducted from the driver’s pay. Similarly, if the customer doesn’t arrive within ten minutes of the 
scheduled time, then the customer will be charged a specific fee based on his/her subsequent arrival.   
ix) Each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes can include an “Incentive 
Fee” wherein at the time of bidding, each driver will be notified of a specific incentive that is payable to 
him/her solely for completing the ride within a specific period of time.      
x) In each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes, the App will be designed so 
that drivers wont be able to manipulate GPS readings: 1) BBB will install its own GPS sensor in the vehicle 
(rather than using the GPS in the driver’s phone); 2) all GPS readings will be controlled by BBB’s 
headquarters and not by the driver’s phone (even if the GSP in the driver’s phone is being used); 3) the 
system will note the vehicle’s location 4-5 times during the ride in other to measure distance; 3) at 
inception of the ride the App/system will calculate the distance to be travelled and the basic fare before the 
bidding begins.     
xi) The Related-Memory Effect of buyers and sellers – see above.        
xii) Each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes can be used for “car-
pooling”, “flexible car-pooling, “van-pooling” and “P2P ride-sharing” models.   
 
The concepts of Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Complexity Theory are applicable; and BBB’s prices 
can be set as follows. On algorithms in general, see: Garcia, Berlanga, Molina & Davila (2004).   
 
 
5.2. Type-1 Pricing.   
 
Theorem-1A: For All Dynamic Pricing Systems That Are Both “Open” Dynamical Systems And “Open” Dynamic 
Games, There Is At Least One Dynamic Pricing Mechanism (Type-1 Pricing) That Can Reduce Deadweight Losses 
And Antitrust Liability, And Involves “two-sided cross-contingent auctions” And “Two-sided State-Contingent 
dynamic pricing”.      
 
Proof: “Open” refers to the fact that both the number of participants and the number of client-provider 
combinations in the pricing mechanism are potentially unlimited, and while the pricing mechanism has some 
“invariants”, it changes constantly. The dynamic pricing mechanism is as follows. In Type-1 pricing, once the 
customer books a ride, the BBB App will provide a “Standard Price” (Ωcs) that is the actual meter rates used by 
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licensed taxis in the city (or if there isn’t any standard meter rate, then BBB’s own publicized meter rate which 
should be less than the black-car taxi rate), and the customer will “bid”/specify the minimum and maximum prices 
that he/she is willing to pay for the ride (hereafter, the “Customer Range” or the set Cr; and Cn is a price within the 
set Cr that satisfies the condition Cn>(Ωcb,0)). The information will be automatically relayed to the 3-15 BBB cars 
that are nearest to the customer, all of whom are required to respond by bidding within minutes. The Base Price 
(Ωcb), is the minimum price required for BBB to earn a profit from the ride less any temporary customer-specific or 
ride-specific losses that BBB will absorb in order to build market share or brand equity. For each such ride, each 
BBB driver can pre-set his/her “preferences” in the BBB App: i) to manually “bid” a specific price only if such 
price exceeds the Base Price (state “Sd1”); or ii) to automatically bid the mid-point of the price range offered by the 
customer, only if such price exceeds the Base Price (state “Sd2”); or iii) to not submit any bid (state “Sd3”) (and 
collectively, the price bid by driver i in the set of drivers 1……..n is Rid; and the lowest price among all bids by all 
drivers is Ωcd). Each driver can simultaneously bid for many customers, but any driver that wins a bid cannot bid 
for any other ride that occurs within one hour before or after his/her winning bid. The customer can revise his/her 
Customer Range only twice, and only upwards and within ten minutes after his/her first bid (states “Sc1”, “Sc2” and 
“Sc3” respectively). After each such revision, each participating driver can revise his/her bid only once. The BBB 
App will automatically assign a primary-driver (with the lowest bid or a combination of one of the lowest bids and 
lowest arrival-times) and a secondary driver (with the next highest bid) to the customer to provide the ride. All 
payments will be made through the BBB app. The model reduces deadweight losses because it dynamically reduces 
both consumer-surplus and producer-surplus. For each ride, BBB will pay the driver a fee equal to the lesser of: i) 
the average percentage of revenues that black-car taxi companies pay their drivers in that city; or ii) X%-Y% (eg. 
75%-90%) of the fees paid by the customer less applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-party car-owners 
– the variables include commercial insurance fees, road-worthiness testing costs; traffic conditions in the city; the 
type/class of car used; the customer’s gratuities; and the driver’s “quality-scores”; etc. (collectively, the fee is 
“ψdd”). BBB’s variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are βv and βf respectively. BBB’s opportunity 
cost is the net profit (“ψob” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-ride) from winning 
and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥob; and the probability ƥlb that another customer with a larger 
fare exists. The driver’s own variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are Dv and Df respectively. The 
driver’s opportunity cost is the net profit (“ψod” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-
ride) from bidding for, and winning and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥod; and the probability ƥld 
that another customer with a larger fare exists. The probability that at least one driver will bid for a customer-ride is 
ƥid. Note that in most cases, and for each driver-customer pair, ƥob and ƥod will be different and based on different 
sets of customers. Both probability-adjusted opportunity costs and the two-sided bidding/price-setting protocols 
incorporate dynamic Regret Minimization into the dynamic pricing model (ie. the reduction in Regret can be 
significant and varies with changes in state variables). The probability that driver i’s bid wins is ƥidw (and the 
probabilities for drivers 1…….n are ƥ1dw……ƥndw). Generally, Ωcb < Ωcd < Ωcs < Cn. ▄           
 
Theorem-1B: For All Prices That Are Real Numbers, There Is Least One Equilibrium Payoff That Satisfies The 
Conditions Of Type-1 Pricing And The Elements Of The Mixed Games (eg. multi-sided auctions; matching games; 
assignment games; differential games; reverse-dutch auctions; multi-stability; and combinatorial auctions) And 
Dynamic Algorithms Involved; And Can Reduce Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability.  
Proof:  
BBB’s objective function and payoff for the ride is:  
Po1 = Max [(min{Cn; Max(0;(Ωcd│Min(Sd1,Sd2,Sd3)); Ωcb))}-(ψob*(ƥob│ƥlb))-(ψdd+βf+βv))* ƥid)]; iff  Cn>(Ωcb; Ωcd); or  
 
Po2 = Max [((Max(0;(Ωcd│Min(Sd1,Sd2,Sd3)); Ωcb) -(ψob*(ƥob│ƥlb))-(ψdd+βf+βv))*ƥid)]; iff Cn< (Ωcb; Ωcd)  
 
The driver’s simple payoff function is:  
Ps = Max[{(ƥid│ƥidw)*(ψdd- Dv -Df-(ψod*(ƥod│ƥld)))}; 0]; where (0<ψdd) є Ωcd                                            
 
These formulas can also answer the question of when a consumer will join a sharing system – and generally 
and with limited consideration of the customers’ non-monetary utility from expedited service and or convenience, 
that becomes more probable as [Max(Po1, Po2) + Ps] → -∞.  ▄         
 
5.3. Type-2 Pricing.  
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Theorem-2A: For All Dynamic Pricing Systems That Are Both “Open” Dynamical Systems And “Open” Dynamic 
Games, There Is At Least One Dynamic Pricing Mechanism (Type-2 Pricing) That Can Reduce Deadweight Losses 
And Antitrust Liability, And Involves “two-sided cross-contingent auctions” And “Two-sided State-Contingent 
dynamic pricing”.      
 
Proof: “Open” refers to the fact that both the number of participants and the number of client-provider 
combinations in the pricing mechanism are potentially unlimited, and while the pricing mechanism has some 
“invariants”, it changes constantly. The dynamic pricing mechanism is as follows. In Type-2 pricing, once the 
customer books a ride, the BBB App will provide “estimated prices” from 3-7 drivers that are nearest to such 
customer and the prices will be capped at 70%-85% of the official meter rates used by licensed taxis in that city or a 
publicized BBB meter rate (which should be less than the local average black-car taxi rate) if there isn’t any official 
taxi meter rate (collectively, the “Standard Price” or Ωcs). The Standard Price will be greater than a Base Price (the 
Base Price, Ωcb, is the minimum price required for BBB to earn a profit from the ride). Each driver is required to 
respond within minutes by: i) automatically setting his/her “preferences” in the BBB App to bid at the “Standard 
Price” offered by BBB to the customer (state “Sd1”), or ii) automatically setting his/her “preferences” in the BBB 
App to manually bid at prices between the Base Price and the Standard Price (state “Sd2”); iii) automatically setting 
his/her “preferences” in the BBB App not to bid (state “Sd3”) (and collectively, the resulting price for driver i in the 
set of drivers 1……n, is Rid; and the lowest price among all bids by all drivers is Ωcd). Each driver can 
simultaneously bid for many customers, but any driver that wins a bid cannot bid for any other ride that occurs 
within a specific time (eg. 30 minutes) before or after his/her winning bid. All drivers must inform BBB about 
when they are off-duty and cannot return to duty unless a specific time elapses; and any driver that doesn’t bid for a 
customer will pay a small fee to BBB. The customer can revise the Standard Price only once and only downwards 
but above the Base Price and within ten minutes after the drivers’ bids are sent to him/her (states “Sc1” and “Sc2” 
respectively). The BBB App will automatically assign a primary-driver (with the lowest bid or a combination of 
one of the lowest bids and lowest arrival-times) and a secondary driver (with the next highest bid – just in case the 
primary driver doesn’t arrive on time) to the customer to provide the ride. Independent unaffiliated commercial 
drivers whose vehicles have commercial plates can also bid for Type-2 customers by downloading the BBB App 
and bidding at prices between the Base Price and the Standard Price. All payments will be made through the BBB 
app. BBB will pay the driver a fee equal to the lesser of: i) the average percentage of revenues that black-car taxi 
companies pay their drivers in that city less applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-party car-owners; or 
ii) X%-Y% (eg. 75%-90%) of the fees paid by the customer less applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-
party car-owners – the variables include commercial insurance fees, road-worthiness testing costs; traffic conditions 
in the city; the type/class of car used; the customer’s gratuities; and the driver’s “quality-scores”; etc. (collectively, 
“ψdd”). BBB’s variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are Bv and Bf respectively. BBB’s opportunity 
cost is the net profit (“ψob” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-ride) from winning 
and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥob; and the probability ƥlb that another customer with a larger 
fare exists. The driver’s own variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are Dv and Df respectively. The 
driver’s opportunity cost is the net profit (“ψod” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-
ride) from bidding for, and winning and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥod; and the probability ƥld 
that another customer with a larger fare exists. Both probability-adjusted opportunity costs and the two-sided 
bidding/price-setting protocols incorporate elements of dynamic Regret Minimization into the dynamic pricing 
model (ie. the reduction in Regret can be significant and varies with changes in state variables). The probability that 
at least one driver will bid for a customer-ride is ƥid. Note that in most cases, and for each driver-customer pair, ƥob 
and ƥod will be different and based on different sets of customers. The probability that driver i’s bid wins is ƥidw (and 
the probabilities for drivers 1…….n are ƥ1dw……ƥndw).  ▄ 
 
Theorem-2B: For All Prices That Are Real Numbers, There Is Least One Equilibrium Payoff That Satisfies The 
Conditions Of Type-2 Pricing And The Elements Of The Mixed Games (eg. multi-sided auctions; matching games; 
assignment games; differential games; reverse-dutch auctions; multi-stability; and combinatorial auctions) And 
Dynamic Algorithms Involved; And Can Reduce Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability.  
Proof:  
BBB’s objective function and payoff for the ride is:  
Po = Max [(min{Ωcs; Max(Ωcb; 0; (Ωcd│Min(Sd1,Sd2,Sd3)))}-(ψob*(ƥob│ƥlb))-(ψdd+βf+βv))*ƥid] 
10 
 
  
The driver’s payoff is:  
Ps = Max[{(ƥid│ƥidw)*(ψdd- Dv -Df-(ψod*(ƥod│ƥld)))}; 0]; where (0<ψdd) є Ωcd       
 
These formulas can also answer the question of when a consumer will join a sharing system – and generally 
and with limited consideration of the customers’ non-monetary utility from expedited service and or convenience, 
that becomes more probable as (Po+Ps) → -∞.   
The dynamic pricing model reduces deadweight losses because it dynamically reduces both consumer-
surplus and supplier-surplus (ie. the reductions vary with the bidding patterns and other state variables). ▄ 
 
 
5.4. Type-3 Pricing.  
 
Theorem-3A: For All Dynamic Pricing Systems That Are Both “Open” Dynamical Systems And “Open” Dynamic 
Games And Wherein Priority-Of-Service Is Important, There Is At Least One Dynamic Pricing Mechanism (Type-3 
Pricing) That Can Reduce Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability, And Involves “two-sided cross-contingent 
auctions” And “Two-sided State-Contingent dynamic pricing”.      
 
Proof: “Open” refers to the fact that both the number of participants and the number of client-provider 
combinations in the pricing mechanism are potentially unlimited, and while the pricing mechanism has some 
“invariants”, it changes constantly. The dynamic pricing mechanism is as follows. In Type-3 “Priority1 Pricing” 
(which targets customers that volunteer to pay more in order to get priority service at any time), once a customer 
books a ride, BBB will offer a “Standard Price” (Ωcs) which will not exceed the taxi meter-rate used in that city (or 
if there isn’t any official taxi meter rate, then a publicized BBB meter rate which should be less than the local 
average black-car taxi rate) but will be greater than a Base Price. The Base Price (Ωcb) is the minimum price 
required for BBB to earn a profit from the ride, minus any ride-specific losses that that BBB is willing to absorb 
solely for customer retention or brand building. The customer will have the opportunity (but is not required) to 
“bid” the highest price that he/she is willing to pay for that ride (a “Priority1-Price” or Ωp) which must exceed the 
Standard Price. The customer can revise the Priority1-Price only twice and only upwards and within ten minutes 
after his/her first bid (states “Sc1”, “Sc2” and “Sc3” respectively). After each such revision, each participating driver 
can change his/her bid only once. The BBB App will then automatically relay the Priority1-Price (and any 
revisions) to 3-15 drivers that are nearest and have the lowest arrival-time to the customer’s location. Each of the 3-
15 selected drivers can respond by setting their “preferences” (in the BBB App) to only one of five states: i) 
automatically accept the Priority Price (state “Sd1”); or ii) to bid a percentage of the Priority1-Price (eg. 70%-99% 
of the Priority1-Price) that exceeds the Standard Price (state “Sd2”); or iii) to accept the Standard Price (state “Sd3”); 
or iv) to manually bid at prices between the Priority Price and the Base Price (state “Sd4”); or v) not to bid (state 
“Sd5”) (and collectively, the price bid by driver i in the set of drivers 1……..n is Ωid; and the lowest price among all 
bids by all drivers is Ωcd – also the low price bid by the selected driver with the lowest price-arrival combination). 
The BBB App will automatically assign a primary-driver (with the lowest bid or a combination of one of the lowest 
bids and lowest arrival-times) and a secondary driver (with the next higher bid) to the customer to provide the ride. 
Each driver can simultaneously bid for many customers, but any driver that wins a bid cannot bid for any other ride 
that occurs within a specific time (eg. thirty minutes) before or after his/her assigned ride. All drivers must inform 
BBB about when they are off-duty and cannot return to duty unless a specific time elapses; and any driver that 
doesn’t bid for a customer will pay a small fee to BBB; and any driver that is selected and that bids, must deliver 
the ride. Independent unaffiliated commercial drivers whose vehicles have commercial plates can also bid for Type-
3 customers by downloading the BBB App and bidding below the Priority Price. The customer will be notified of a 
final price before he/she makes payment. All payments will be made through the BBB app. BBB will pay drivers a 
fee equal to the lesser of: i) the average percentage of revenues that black-car taxi companies pay their drivers in 
that city less applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-party car-owners; or ii) X%-Y% (eg. 75%-90%) of 
the fees paid by the customer less applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-party car-owners – the 
variables include commercial insurance fees, road-worthiness testing costs; traffic conditions in the city; the 
type/class of car used; the customer’s gratuities; and the driver’s “quality-scores”; etc. (collectively, the fee is 
“ψdd”). BBB’s variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are βv and βf respectively. BBB’s opportunity 
cost is the net profit (“ψob” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-ride) from winning 
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and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥob; and the probability ƥlb that another customer with a larger 
fare exists. The driver’s own variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are Dv and Df respectively. The 
driver’s opportunity cost is the net profit (“ψod” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-
ride) from bidding for, and winning and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥod; and the probability ƥld 
that another customer with a larger fare exists. Both probability-adjusted opportunity costs and the two-sided 
bidding/price-setting protocols incorporate dynamic Regret Minimization into the dynamic pricing model (ie. the 
reduction in Regret can be significant and varies with changes in state variables). See Nwogugu (2006). The 
probability that at least one driver will bid is ƥid. Note that in most cases, and for each driver-customer pair, ƥob and 
ƥod will be different and based on different sets of customers. The probability that driver i’s bid wins is ƥdw. 
Generally, Ωcb < Ωcd < Ωcs.  ▄ 
 
Theorem-3B: For All Prices That Are Real Numbers, There Is Least One Equilibrium Payoff That Satisfies The 
Conditions Of Type-3 Pricing And The Elements Of The Mixed Games (eg. multi-sided auctions; matching games; 
assignment games; reverse-dutch auctions; multi-stability; and combinatorial auctions) And Dynamic Algorithms 
Involved; And Can Reduce Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability.  
Proof:  
BBB’s objective function and payoff is:  
Po = Max [(min{Ωp; Max((Ωcd│Min(Sd1;Sd2;Sd3;Sd4;Sd5)); Ωcs; 0; Ωcb)} -(ψob*(ƥob│ƥlb))-(ψdd+βf+βv))*ƥid)].  
 
The driver’s payoff function is:  
Ps = Max[{(ƥid│ƥidw)*(ψdd- Dv -Df-(ψod*(ƥod│ƥld)))}; 0]; where (0<ψdd) є Ωcd.                                                   
 
These formulas can also answer the question of when a consumer will join a sharing system – and generally 
and with limited consideration of the customers’ non-monetary utility from expedited service and or convenience, 
that becomes more probable as (Po+Ps) → -∞.   
The model reduces deadweight losses because it dynamically reduces both consumer-surplus and supplier-
surplus (ie. the reductions vary with the bidding patterns and other state variables). ▄      
 
 
5.5. Type-4 Pricing.   
 
Theorem-4A: For All Dynamic Pricing Systems That Are Both “Open” Dynamical Systems And “Open” Dynamic 
Games And Targets “Price-And-Value” Sensitive Customers, There Is At Least One Dynamic Pricing Mechanism 
(Type-4 Pricing) That Can Reduce Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability, And Involves “two-sided cross-
contingent auctions” And “Two-sided State-Contingent dynamic pricing”.      
 
Proof: “Open” refers to the fact that both the number of participants and the number of client-provider 
combinations in the pricing mechanism are potentially unlimited, and while the pricing mechanism has some 
“invariants”, it changes constantly. The dynamic pricing mechanism is as follows. In Type-4 “Flex Pricing” 
(which targets price/value sensitive customers), once a customer books a ride, BBB will offer a “Standard Price” 
(Ωcs) which will not exceed the taxi meter-rate used in that city (or a publicized BBB meter rate if there isn’t any 
official taxi meter rate) but will be greater than a Base Price (the Base Price Ωcb, is the minimum price required for 
BBB to earn a profit from the ride, minus any losses that that BBB is willing to absorb solely for customer retention 
or brand building). The customer will be required to “bid” a price Cn that is within a “Flex Range” (“Cr”; a set 
which is a 20%-/+ band above and below the Standard Price). This “Flex Price” Cn is a price within the set Cr that 
satisfies the condition Cn>(Ωcb,0). The BBB App will then automatically relay the Flex-Price to 3-15 drivers that 
are nearest to, and have the lowest arrival-time to the customer’s location. Each of the 3-15 selected drivers can 
respond by setting their “preferences” (in the BBB App) to only one of five states: i) automatically bid/accept the 
Flex Price (state “Sd1”); or ii) to bid at the Standard Price (state “Sd2”); or iii) to bid a pre-set percentage of the 
Standard Price that is within the Flex Range (state “Sd3”); or iv) to manually bid at prices within the Flex Range 
(state “Sd4”); or v) not to bid (state “Sd5”) (and collectively, the price bid by driver i in the set of drivers 1……..n is 
Ωid; and the lowest price among all bids by all drivers is Ωcd). BBB will assign a primary-driver (a driver with the 
lowest bid or a combination of one of the lowest bids and lowest arrival-times) and a secondary driver (with the 
next highest bid) to the customer to provide the ride. Each driver can simultaneously bid for many customers, but 
12 
 
any driver that wins a bid cannot bid for any other ride that occurs within a specific time (eg. 30 minutes) before or 
after his/her winning bid. All drivers must inform BBB about when they are off-duty and cannot return to duty 
unless a specific time elapses; and any driver that doesn’t bid for a customer will pay a small fee to BBB. 
Independent unaffiliated commercial drivers whose vehicles have commercial plates can also bid for Type-3 
customers by downloading the BBB App and bidding below the Priority Price. The customer will be notified of a 
final price before he/she makes payment. All payments will be made through the BBB app. BBB will pay drivers a 
fee equal to the lesser of: i) the average percentage of revenues that black-car taxi companies pay their drivers in 
that city less applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-party car-owners; or ii) X%-Y% (eg. 75%-90%) of 
the fees paid by the customer less applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-party car-owners – the 
variables include commercial insurance fees, road-worthiness testing costs; traffic conditions in the city; the 
type/class of car used; the customer’s gratuities; and the driver’s “quality-scores”; etc. (collectively, the fee is 
“ψdd”). BBB’s variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are βv and βf respectively. BBB’s opportunity 
cost is the net profit (“ψob” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-ride) from winning 
and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥob; and the probability ƥlb that another customer with a larger 
fare exists. The driver’s own variable costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are Dv and Df respectively. The 
driver’s opportunity cost is the net profit (“ψod” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-
ride) from bidding for, and winning and servicing another customer with a probability of ƥod; and the probability ƥld 
that another customer with a larger fare exists. Both probability-adjusted opportunity costs and the two-sided 
bidding/price-setting protocols incorporate elements of dynamic Regret Minimization into the dynamic pricing 
model (ie. the reduction in Regret can be significant and varies with changes in state variables).The probability that 
at least one driver will bid is ƥid. Note that in most cases, and for each driver-customer pair, ƥob and ƥod will be 
different and based on different sets of customers. The probability that driver i’s bid wins is ƥidw (and the 
probabilities for drivers 1…….n are ƥ1dw……ƥndw). Generally, its hoped that Ωcb < Ωcd < Ωcs < Cn. ▄ 
 
Theorem-4B: For All Prices That Are Real Numbers, There Is Least One Equilibrium Payoff That Satisfies The 
Conditions Of Type-4 Pricing And The Elements Of The Mixed Games (eg. multi-sided auctions; matching games; 
assignment games; differential games; reverse-dutch auctions; multi-stability; and combinatorial auctions) And 
Dynamic Algorithms Involved; And Reduces Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability.  
Proof:  
BBB’s objective function and payoff for the ride is:  
 
Po = Max [(({Max((Rcd│Min(Sd1;Sd2;Sd3;Sd4;Sd5)); 0; Ωcb) є Cn}-(ψob*(ƥob│ƥlb))-(ψdd+βf+βv))*ƥid)].  
 
The driver’s simple payoff function for the ride is:  
Ps = Max[{(ƥid│ƥidw)*(ψdd- Dv -Df-(ψod*(ƥod│ƥld)))}; 0]; where (0<ψdd) є Ωcd.       
 
These formulas can also answer the question of when a consumer will join a sharing system – and generally 
and with limited consideration of the customers’ non-monetary utility from expedited service and or convenience, 
that becomes more probable as (Po+Ps) → -∞.   
The model reduces deadweight losses because it dynamically reduces both consumer-surplus and supplier-
surplus (ie. the reductions vary with the bidding patterns and other state variables). ▄ 
 
 
5.6. Type-5 Pricing.  
 
Theorem-5A: For All Dynamic Pricing Systems That Are Both “Open” Dynamical Systems And “Open” Dynamic 
Games And Wherein Priority-Of-Service Is Important, There Is At Least One Dynamic Pricing Mechanism (Type-5 
Pricing) That Can Reduce Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability, And Involves “two-sided cross-contingent 
auctions” And “Two-sided State-Contingent dynamic pricing”.      
 
Proof: “Open” refers to the fact that both the number of participants and the number of client-provider 
combinations in the pricing mechanism are potentially unlimited, and while the pricing mechanism has some 
“invariants”, it changes constantly. The dynamic pricing mechanism is as follows. In Type-5 “Priority2 Pricing” 
(which targets customers that volunteer to pay more in order to get priority service at any time), once a customer 
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books a ride, BBB will offer a “Standard Price” (Ωcs) which will not exceed the taxi meter-rate used in that city (or 
if there isn’t any official taxi meter rate, then a publicized BBB meter rate which should be less than the local 
average black-car taxi rate) but will be greater than a Base Price. The Base Price (Ωcb) is the minimum price 
required for BBB to earn a profit from the ride, minus any ride-specific losses that that BBB is willing to absorb 
solely for customer retention or brand building. The customer will be required to “bid” the lowest price that he/she 
is willing to pay for that ride (a “Priority2 Price” or Ωp) which must exceed the Base Price. The customer can 
revise the Priority2-Price only once and only upwards and within ten minutes after his/her first bid (states “Sc1” and 
“Sc2” respectively). The BBB App will then automatically relay the Priority2-Price to 3-15 drivers that are nearest 
and have the lowest arrival-time to the customer’s location. Each of the 3-15 selected drivers can respond by setting 
their “preferences” (in the BBB App) to only one of five states: i) to automatically accept the Priority Price (state 
“Sd1”); or ii) to bid a percentage of the Priority-Price (eg. 70%-99% of the Priority Price) that exceeds the Standard 
Price (state “Sd2”); or iii) to accept the Standard Price (state “Sd3”); or iv) to manually bid at prices between the 
Priority Price and the Base Price (state “Sd4”); or v) not to bid (state “Sd5”) (and collectively, the price bid by driver 
i in the set of drivers 1……..n is Ωid; and the highest price among all bids by all drivers is Ωcd – also the low price 
bid by the selected driver with the lowest price-arrival combination). The driver with the highest bid (or a 
combination of one of the highest bids and lowest arrival-times) that is below the Priority2-Price will be 
automatically selected to provide the ride. Each driver can simultaneously bid for many ride-customer pairs, but 
any driver that wins a bid cannot bid for any other ride that occurs within 30 minutes after his/her assigned ride. All 
drivers must inform BBB about when they are off-duty and cannot return to duty unless a specific time elapses; and 
any driver that doesn’t bid for a customer will pay a small fee to BBB. Independent unaffiliated commercial drivers 
whose vehicles have commercial plates can also bid for Type-5 customers by downloading the BBB App and 
bidding below the Priority Price. The BBB App will automatically assign a primary-driver (with the lowest bid or a 
combination of one of the lowest bids and lowest arrival-times) and a secondary driver (with the next highest bid) 
to the customer to provide the ride. The customer will be notified of a final price before he/she makes payment. All 
payments will be made through the BBB app. BBB will pay drivers a fee equal to the lesser of: i) the average 
percentage of revenues that black-car taxi companies pay their drivers in that city less applicable taxes and less any 
fees payable to third-party car-owners; or ii) X%-Y% (eg. 75%-90%) of the fees paid by the customer less 
applicable taxes and less any fees payable to third-party car-owners – the variables include commercial insurance 
fees, road-worthiness testing costs; traffic conditions in the city; the type/class of car used; the customer’s 
gratuities; and the driver’s “quality-scores”; etc. (collectively, the fee is “ψdd”). BBB’s variable costs and allocated 
fixed costs for the ride are Bv and Bf respectively. BBB’s opportunity cost is the net profit (“ψob” – the “net” 
incremental profit over and above that of the matched-ride) from winning and servicing another customer with a 
probability of ƥob; and the probability ƥlb that another customer with a larger fare exists. The driver’s own variable 
costs and allocated fixed costs for the ride are Dv and Df respectively. The driver’s opportunity cost is the net profit 
(“ψod” – the “net” incremental profit over and above that of the matched-ride) from bidding for, and winning and 
servicing another customer with a probability of ƥod; and the probability ƥld that another customer with a larger fare 
exists. Both probability-adjusted opportunity costs and the two-sided bidding/price-setting protocols incorporate 
dynamic Regret Minimization into the dynamic pricing model (ie. the reduction in Regret can be significant and 
varies with changes in state variables). The probability that there at least one driver will bid is ƥid. Note that in most 
cases, and for each driver-customer pair, ƥob and ƥod will be different and based on different sets of customers. The 
probability that driver i’s bid wins is ƥdw. Generally, it’s hoped that Rcb < Rcd < Rcs.  ▄ 
 
 
Theorem-5B: For All Prices That Are Real Numbers, There Is Least One Equilibrium Payoff That Satisfies The 
Conditions Of Type-5 Pricing And The Elements Of The Mixed Games (eg. multi-sided auctions; matching games; 
assignment games; reverse-dutch auctions; multi-stability; and combinatorial auctions) And Dynamic Algorithms 
Involved; And Can Reduce Deadweight Losses And Antitrust Liability.  
Proof:  
BBB’s objective function and payoff is:  
Po = Max [(min{Ωp; Max((Ωcd│Max(Sd1;Sd2;Sd3;Sd4;Sd5)); Ωcs; 0; Ωcb)}-(ψb*(ƥob│ƥlb))-(ψdd+βf+βv))*ƥid)] 
  
The driver’s payoff is:  
Ps = Max[{(ƥid│ƥidw)*(ψdd- Dv -Df-(ψod*(ƥod│ƥld)))}; 0]; where (0<ψdd) є Ωcd.                                             
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These formulas can also answer the question of when a consumer will join a sharing system – and generally 
and with limited consideration of the customers’ non-monetary utility from expedited service and or convenience, a 
customer is more likely to join the sharing system as (Po+Ps) → -∞.   
The dynamic pricing model reduces deadweight losses because it dynamically reduces both consumer-
surplus and supplier-surplus (ie. the reductions vary with the bidding patterns and other state variables). ▄ 
 
 
Theorem-6: For Each Of Type1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 And Type-5 Pricing, There Is Or There Can Be Multi-
Stability, But There Is No Unique Equilibrium Or Pure-Nash Equilibrium.  
Proof:  
There is or there can be Multi-stability in each of the Type1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 And Type-5 pricing 
mechanisms and there is no unique equilibrium or pure Nash Equilibrium simply because of any of the following 
factors: i) the “cross-contingent auction” feature (introduced herein and above); ii) the combinatorial feature of 
combinatorial auctions; iii) each player cannot know the equilibrium strategies of the other players; iv) in some 
circumstances, a player can gain by changing only their own strategy (while other players don’t change their 
strategies), but that is not very common.  ▄ 
 
 
Theorem-7: Contrary To Generally Accepted Theorems, And For Each Of Type1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 And 
Type-5 Pricing Mechanisms, Any Conditionality (x│y) That Involves Any Of The Probabilities ƥob, ƥlb, ƥod, ƥld And 
ƥdw, Is “Non-Recursive”.  
Proof:  
Its widely accepted in Math and statistics (especially after Kolmogorov) that conditional probabilities are recursive. 
Contrary to those theorems, in the Type1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 And Type-5 pricing-mechanism payoff 
functions (defined herein and above), all conditional probabilities are non-recursive because: i) any event that 
pertains to any provider-customer (driver-customer) pair does not wholly depend on their history of transactions or 
the history of each person’s transactions with similar counter-parties in the system; ii) the “cross-contingent 
auction” feature of the bidding and price-setting system (explained herein and above) increases the possibility (and 
almost ensures) that any prior patterns of bidding will not be repeated in the future or that probabilities are recursive 
because of the changing combinations of participants in both sides of the system; iii) the combinatorial auction 
feature of the pricing system, significantly eliminates recursion of probabilities and makes it almost unlikely that 
any prior bidding patterns will be repeated; iv) the bidding by any driver-customer pair can be affected by bidding 
by another related or un-related driver-customer pair; v) as a result, there is no or very minimal Status Quo Bias. 
That implies that most or a significant portion of Bayesian statistics is or may be wrong. The issue of conditional 
probabilities is also relevant to Mckelveya & Page (2002) and Wolitzsky (2016) which analyzed the relationship 
between Bayesian Equilibrium and the Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem. Gelman (2008), Thompson 
(2007) and Cox (2006) critiqued Bayesian statistics. Hahn (2014) noted the increasing use of Bayesian statistics in 
modern cognition and psychometric studies, and surveyed articles that critiqued Bayesian Statistics.  ▄      
 
 
Theorem-8: Since The Probabilities ƥob, ƥlb, ƥod, ƥld and ƥdw (For Each Of Type1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 And Type-
5 Pricing Mechanisms) Are “Non-Recursive Probabilities”, The Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem Is 
Null And Void (Or Does Not apply In all Circumstances).     
Proof:  
The issue of recursiveness of conditional probabilities is also relevant to Bayesian Equilibrium, which is based on 
Baye’s Rule. Since the Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem is partly based on Bayesian Equilibrium, and 
Bayes Theorem is wrong or does not apply in all circumstances (as shown above) and the Probabilities ƥob, ƥlb, ƥod, 
ƥld and ƥdw are “Non-Recursive Probabilities” then the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem is null and 
void. Mckelveya & Page (2002), Colini-Baldeschi, Goldberg, et. al. (Nov. 2017), Othman & Sandholm (2009) and 
Wolitzsky (2016) discussed the relationship between Bayesian Equilibrium and the Myerson–Satterthwaite 
Impossibility Theorem.  
Separately, given the assumptions underlying Bayesian statistics and Bayesian Equilibrium, and Theorems 
6 & 7 herein, the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem cannot be valid. Under Perfect Bayesian 
Equlibrium, beliefs and strategies must comply with the following conditions: 
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i) Sequential Rationality: given the beliefs, each strategy should be optimal in expectation. A “belief 
system” refers to allocation of probabilities to nodes in a game here the sum of all such probabilities is one.  
ii) Consistency: each belief should be updated according to Baye’s Rule and the strategies, for all non-zero 
probabilities (but in paths of zero probability, aka off-the-equilibrium paths, the beliefs can be arbitrary). 
 
In this instance, there cannot be Sequential Rationality or Consistency because of the factors mentioned above in 
Theorems 6 & 7.   ▄     
 
 
Theorem-9: The Mechanisms Introduced In Colini-Baldeschi, Goldberg, et. al. (Nov. 2017), Does Not Provide IR 
(Individual Rationality), IC (Incentive Compatibility) And SBB (strong budget-balance). 
Proof:  
Colini-Baldeschi, Goldberg, et. al. (Nov. 2017) claimed that their mechanism was the first IR (Individual 
Rationality), IC (Incentive Compatibility) and SBB (strong budget-balance) mechanisms that provides an O(1)-
approximation to the optimal social welfare for two-sided markets. Their claim is false because: i) their 
mechanisms partly depends on Bayesian Equilibrium which in such instance, cannot hold; and ii) the probabilities 
implied in their model assume conditionality, which also cannot hold given the above mentioned theorems; iii) their 
assumption that there is a given probability distribution for sellers’ preferences is wrong.  ▄ 
 
5.7. The New Dynamic Pricing Models Are “Deep Learning” Algorithms And They Can Prevent/Reduce 
Algorithm Collusion.   
In each of the Type-1, Type-2, Type-3, Type-4 and Type-5 pricing schemes, unforseen events (such as road 
accidents; fuel shortages), memory (roughly recurring events) and predictable events (such as high road traffic or 
low customer demand) are accounted for in the dynamic pricing model by: 1) the two-sided auctions for each ride 
which inherently includes learning by the pricing system, the driver and the customer; 2) “learning” in the 
calculation of the Base-Price by BBB; 3) “learning” in the calculation of the driver’s and the customer’s 
opportunity costs.  
Thus, the new dynamic pricing models are evolutionary and incorporate Learning (ie. beliefs about others' 
decisions; continuous updating of assumptions and variables; identification of relationships among variables; and 
Reinforcement Learning) because:  
1) the models can include new and continuously updated data about state variables (eg. which are used to 
calculate the Standard-Price and Base-Price) such as real-life conditions on the road, neighborhood traffic 
patterns, the driver’s mental state; the customer’s mental state and preferences; and the state of competition 
in the ride-sharing market;  
2) in some of the models, the auction-protocol involves BBB setting a Base Price or Standard Price 
(around which bidding occurs) and then the system “learns” the demand for services around such prices;  
3) since the bidding by any driver-customer pair can be affected by bidding by another related or un-related 
driver-customer pair, each dynamic pricing model implicitly “learns” and incorporates market conditions;  
4) as mentioned above, the structure of the dynamic pricing systems can cause both it, and the buyers and 
sellers (especially those to follow routines) to develop “long memory” about bidding patterns, service-
experience and state variables such as traffic, weather and other competing companies;  
5) each payoff model is essentially a decision model and the probabilities used are akin to decision weights, 
and thus each such payoff model is stochastic because the subjective probability that an event occurs or that 
a decision is made can be expressed as the ratio of its own decision-weight to the sum of all weights. See 
the comments in Mohri & Medina (2014) and Nazerzadeh, Leme, et. al. (2016).   
 
Furthermore, the new pricing algorithms introduced in this article can prevent and or reduce all types of 
Algorithm Collusion because: i) most of the data sources for prices are “within-system”; ii) updating is done in 
ways that reduce correlation with other pricing systems; iii) a substantial percentage of the data is “transaction-
specific” (tailored to a specific transaction); iv) the company’s own cost-structure and operating conditions are 
given substantial weights in the pricing algorithms; v) the algorithms are structurally different from traditional 
pricing algorithms.   
On Deep Learning and Regret Minimization in Mechanism Design, see: Feng, Narasimhan & Parkes 
(2018), Golowich, Narasimhan & Parkes (2018), Dutting, Feng, et. al. (2019), Shen, Peng, et. al. (2017), and 
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Sandholm & Likhodedov (2015). However, many "Learning" models suffer from the problems/weaknesses that 
were explained in Nwogugu (2013b) (invalidity of the mean variance framework), Nwogugu (2017a;b;c;d) (biases 
in returns; Framing Effects; asset pricing errors; invalidity of risk aversion and loss aversion; etc.) and Nwogugu 
(2007; 2006) (critique of bankruptcy prediction models, LOGIT/PROBIT/regressions, Neural Networks, 
ARCH/GARCH/ARMA/SV models).   
 
 
Theorem-10: Each of The New Dynamic Pricing Models Violates The Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility 
Theorem. 
Proof:    
Each of the five new dynamic pricing models introduced herein has all the following properties:     
i) Individual Rationality of buyers - for each buyer, there is a bid such that the buyer always obtains non-
negative utility.  
ii) Individual Rationality of sellers.  
iii) Strong Budget Balance – not all buyer’s payments are given to the seller, but the portion given to the 
seller reflects fair value for services rendered or goods provided.  
iv) Dominant-Strategy Incentive Compatibility of buyers and sellers – each buyer and seller can achieve the 
best outcome to him/herself by reporting/acting according to his/her true preferences/valuations.  
v) Pareto Optimality - there is no other allocation/matching superior to that provided by the mechanism in 
all aspects, provided all buyers report their true valuation (its assumed that mechanism structure encourages 
truth-telling by buyers and sellers).     
vi) Feasibility – with respect to real-world constraints.  
vii) Privacy – the identities of bidders (on both sides of the system) are not disclosed and for each 
“contract” or transaction (eg. a taxi-ride or Airbnb rental), only the winning seller-buyer pair are introduced 
to each other.    
viii) Welfare Maximization (both Exact And Approximate) – with regards to the overall system.  
 
Its noteworthy that each of the five new dynamic pricing models violates the Myerson-Satterthwaite 
Impossibility Theorem because each has the characteristics of individual rationality; strong budget balance; 
incentive compatibility of buyers/sellers and pareto-optimality and “learning”.  
Mckelveya & Page (2002) and Wolitzsky (2016) analyzed the relationship between Bayesian Equilibrium 
and the Myerson–Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem.  
  ▄ 
 
6. A Legal Business Model In Place Of Uber And Lyft. 
The following is a legal business model for a hypothetical company named “BBB” that achieves same 
objectives as Uber or Lyft or Grab (as of mid-2017, the combined equity market-values of the top-five taxi SEOs 
such as Uber, Lyft, Grab and Didi Chuxing exceeded US$140 billion). BBB will obtain a blanket taxi license from 
the city government which will: i) enable BBB’s taxis to provide pre-booked rides within the city/town; ii) allow 
BBB to operate using vehicles that have commercial-plates and commercial licenses; iii) allow BBB to operate 
using private vehicles that have current private plates, have passed city-sanctioned road-worthiness tests and have 
valid commercial insurance policies provided by BBB; and that are operated by drivers with ordinary (non-
commercial) or commercial driving licenses where each such non-commercial driver will have to obtain a medical 
certificate from a doctor to confirm that he/she is fit to drive with passengers; iv) require that BBB obtain 
commercial vehicle insurance for each such driver-vehicle pair or submit copies of the driver’s commercial vehicle 
insurance; v) require that BBB collect tax revenues from independent contractor drivers and affiliated car owners 
and remit same to the city/state/federal governments. The commercial insurance policies must provide coverage for 
commercial passengers and non-commercial drivers that carry passengers in commercial transactions. BBB will use 
the following classes of cars:        
i) BBB will purchase cars or lease cars and obtain commercial plates and commercial vehicle insurance for 
each such car (Type-A cars). BBB can obtain significant price discounts by buying or leasing large 
quantities of used cars at the same time and obtaining group insurance and group road-worthiness testing 
for such cars. BBB can also negotiate with the city government to provide discounts for commercial plate 
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fees and road-worthiness fees (that are administered by the city government). BBB will lease its Type-A 
cars to un-affiliated drivers on a weekly or monthly basis and BBB will deduct such lease payments and 
income taxes from revenues generated by each Type-A drivers. The drivers can be non-commercial or 
commercial drivers. BBB will provide commercial vehicle insurance policies for such non-commercial 
drivers. 
ii) BBB will also enter into strategic alliances with third-party owners of cars that have commercial plates 
and commercial insurance (Type-B cars) to lease their cars to both commercial and non-commercial drivers 
on a weekly or monthly basis and such drivers will work within BBB’s network. BBB will deduct such 
lease payments from revenues generated by each Type-B driver, and remit same to the car-owner. BBB 
will provide commercial vehicle insurance policies for such non-commercial drivers. Each such non-
commercial driver will have to obtain a medical certificate from a doctor to confirm that he/she is fit to 
drive with passengers.    
iii) BBB will enter into strategic alliances with third-party drivers that have commercial driver’s licenses 
and own commercial cars which will have commercial plates and commercial insurance (Type-C cars) to 
drive their cars for hire within the BBB network.  
iv) BBB will enter into strategic alliances with third-party drivers that own private cars that have private 
plates to provide rides within the BBB network (Type-D cars). BBB will obtain and pay for commercial 
vehicle insurance (purchased or self insurance) for each such car/driver; and commercial-quality road-
worthiness tests for each such car. Each such non-commercial driver will have to obtain a medical 
certificate from a doctor to confirm that he/she is fit to drive passengers.  
v) For all four classes of cars, “commercial insurance for private cars and or non-commercial drivers” 
means that the commercial insurance policy adjusts for, and covers the specific risks that: i) the driver is 
not a professional driver, may be impaired (eg. eyesight), and is less skilled than commercial drivers, and 
may cause more accidents; ii) there are passengers in the vehicle who are subject to accidents and other 
harm (eg. defective car seats and or seat-belts and or air-conditioners; un-sanitary conditions in the car; 
etc.); iii) the non-commercial driver may not always ensure compliance with, and the private car may not 
always comply with all standards/requirements that apply to commercial vehicles (such as road-worthiness 
tests; emissions; etc.). Self insurance means that BBB will create a subsidiary that will provide the self 
insurance and create balance sheet cash reserves for such risk; and pay-out funds when claims are made; 
and where feasible, re-insure the risk. The balance sheet reserves must be determined by, and satisfactory to 
the city/state government and insurance regulators and reviewed at least quarterly.      
 
Each Type-A, Type-C, Type-D and Type-B car will be fitted with BBB’s sensors which will be linked to 
the BBB-App and the “external GPS” and will detect the duration-of-occupancy of each passenger in the back seat 
of such car, and help in calculating an “estimated revenue” for each such passenger (based on estimated distance 
per minute, meter rates and the customer’s duration of occupancy) which will be compared to the official “actual 
revenues” generated by that car through the BBB app. Each Type-A, Type-C, Type-D and Type-B car will be fitted 
with an external GPS tracking system (separate from the GPS system in the BBB App). All drivers will function as 
independent consultants. BBB will deduct taxes payable by each independent contractor driver and remit same to 
the city, state and federal governments. BBB will develop its ride-sharing app (which will contain a GPS system) 
which prospective drivers, customers and owners of cars can download onto their own cellphones (BBB will not 
provide cellphones to drivers or car owners). The BBB app will be linked to the sensors such that BBB and an 
owner of the Type-B car can track the driver’s location and ride-statistics (eg. number of rides for each week; 
revenues; estimated fuel consumption; etc.) in real time.  
 
7. Conclusion.  
There are several characteristics of the Sharing Economy that make traditional theoretical computer science 
and economic theory hard to apply and some are: i) multi-sided systems/markets; ii) transferable utility. 
The new dynamic pricing models introduced herein address current and future problems inherent in pricing 
mechanisms in the sharing economy and can be used by other non-taxi SEO companies – such as Airbnb, WeWork 
and Liquidspace.   
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